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JANUARY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-TWO
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a
telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
TAXATION-CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION-SECURED DEBTS LAW. State ex rel.
Tompkins v. Shipman.' State ex rel. Doneghy v. Stephens!
In 1917 the General Assembly of Missouri enacted a revenue measure which commonly became known as the secured debts tax act! The
principal provisions of his act were as follows: certain kinds of intangible property, including obligations not payable within one year from
the date of their issue, obligations of a state, county, city, etc., and obligations secured by pledges or deeds of trust were placed in a separate class for purposes of taxation.' A recording tax varying in amount
in proportion to the face value of the instruments evidencing these obligations and the period of their maturity was to be charged on them!
They were to be exempt from further taxation
The act was amended
I.
(1921) 234 S. W. 60.
2. (1921) 234 S. W. 65.
3. Sec. 13137, R. S. Mo., 1919, approved Apr. 13, 1917.
Laws of 1917

p. 539.

4. Sec. 1 of the act; sec. 13137 R. S.
Mo. 1919.
5. Sec. 2 of the act, see 13138 R. S.
Mo. 1919.

6.

(37)

Sec. 2 of the act.

LAW SERIES

25,

MissouRI BULLETIN

in 1921 so as to include obligations secured by mortgages on real estate
and other minor changes were made at the same time.'
This legislation was the culmination of a long agitation brought
about by economic conditions which will be discussed later and was
enacted as a direct response to an appeal by the governor of the state.
In May, 1921, the two cases under review were instituted in the Supreme
Court of the state to test the validity of the legislation.'
In the first
case the argument of counsel turned largely on the point that the tax
thus levied was a privilege tax and not a property tax in any sense.
In the second case the brief on the part of the relator sought to establish
the right of the legislature to classify subjects of taxation even where
the tax was admittedly one on property.' The court held that the tax
was clearly a property tax and it denied the right of the legislature to
classify property and tax classes thus made at different rates. The
court not only took the position that the general property tax is the
only property tax permitted by the constitution,"0 but went further
and defended it on economic grounds.'
The constitutional provisions involved are somewhat different in nature from those existing in other states and are contained in secs. 3 and
4 of Art. X of the state constitution. The first of these sections provides that taxation shall be "uniform on the same class of subjects."'
(Italics supplied.) The second provides that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value."
Are these provisions taken together to be interpreted to mean that
all property in the state, of whatsoever nature it may be, must be taxed
at the same rate and in the same manner? Or, can we take a somewhat
more liberal view and construe them so as to allow classification of property by the legislature and a taxation of such classes at different rates
so long as the taxation in each class is ad valorem and not based on some
other standard? The latter construction, it would seem, would do no
violence to the language, for, as long as value is the measure of taxation within the class the fact that the rate varies between classes does
not prevent the tax from being proportional. The language of section
three italicized above gives color to this construction.
7. Approved Mar. 29, 1921, Laws of
1921 p. 667.
8. Decided July 8, 1921. Motion for
rehearing overruled Oct. 8, 1921.
9. Brief for relator,
10. 234 S. W. 1. c. 64.
11. 234 S. W. 1. c. 65.
12. "Taxes for public purposes only
---must be uniform.-Taxes may be levied

and collected for public purposes only.
They shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax,
and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws."
13. "Taxes in proportion to value.
-All property subject to taxation shall
be taxed in proportion to its value."
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Interpretation of Similar Provisions in Other Jurisdictions.
The analogies of these sections in the Missouri constitution which
appear in the fundamental law of other jurisdictions are of two kinds:
4
(a) provisions requiring that the rule of taxation shall be uniform
and (b) provisions requiring taxes to be levied in proportion to value."
In some states as in our own the two are combined," with however many
differing shades of phraseology. In interpreting the first of the provisions those states in which the matter is not complicated by the effect
of the requirement of ad valorem taxation are practically unanimous in
holding that the constitutional prohibition does not prevent a classification
of property and the taxation of such classes at varying rates so long
as the rate in each class is uniform.
Of course, under the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution such classification must bear a
reasonable and just relationship to the purpose for which it is made and
must not be arbitrary.'
The presence in a number of constitutions of
the words, "uniform upon the same class of subjects" is held to place
the legislative power to classify upon an even more assured footing."
While there is dicta to the effect that the requirement that taxation
shall be ad valorem does not in any way interfere with legislative classification," none of the cases seems to be directly in point and the writer
has found no case directly supporting this proposition. A case in Nebraska' takes the position that a classification is not proper and is forbidden by a constitutional provision somewhat similar to the provision
under discussion. The wording of the section in that state, however,

14. Ark., Col., Fla., Ga., Ind.,
Ky., La., Mich., Minn., Miss.,
Nev., N. J., N. C., N. D., Oh.,
S. C., S. D., Tenn., Texas, Va.,
Wyo.

Kan.,
Mon.,
Ore.,
Wis.,

15. Ala., Ark., Col., Ga., Ill., Mass.,
Mo., Miss., Mon., Neb., N. C., N. D.,
N. J., Oh., Tenn., Texas, W. Va., Wash.
16.

Ark., Col., Ga.,

Miss., Mon., N.

J., N. C., N. D., Oh., Tenn., Texas,
Va., W. Va.
17. Ry. Co. v. Miami County (1903)
67 Kan. 434, 73 Pac. 103; State ex. rel.
v. Smith (1902) 158 Ind. 543, 63 N. E.
25, 63 I. R. A. 116; Com. v. Bank
(1895) 168 Penn. 309, 31 At. 1065; R.
R. Co. v. Board of Assessors (1908) (N.
J. Court of Errors and Appeal) 69 AtlI

239 (Semble) ; Chancellor of State v.
City of Eliabeth (1900) 65 N. J. Law
687, 52 Atl. 1130 (Semble). Board of
Assessors v. R. R. Co. (1886) 48 N. 3.
Law 146 (Semble); R. R. Co. v. Pow.
ers (1906) 201 U. S. 245, 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 459, 50 L. Ed. 744 (Semble).
18. R. R. Co. v. Powers, supra, note
17.

19. Such a clause is present in the
constitutions of Penn., Col., Del., and
Ind. See Com. v. Bank, supra, note 17
and other Pennsylvania cases.
20. See the New Jersey cases cited,
supra, note 17.
21. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
City of Omaha (1905) 73 Neb. 527, 103
N. W. 84.
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is somewhat peculiar and the case can
hardly be said to have a direct
2
bearing on the question in Missouri.'
There is, however, one court, at least, which seems to stand squarely
for the proposition that a requirement that taxation be proportional prevents a classification of property by the legislature.'
In Massachusetts
where the constitution empowers the General Court to levy "proportional
and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes .
,,,'
the provision
was held to prohibit the enactment of legislation somewhat similar to
the Missouri secured debt act on the ground that it involved a legislative
classification of property.1 In one state where the organic law commands that property "which may be taxed ad valorem shall be assessed
for taxation at its fair cash value"

.

.

.

,

it was held that the exemp-

tion of mortgages and the debts secured thereby from an ad valorem
tax and the substitution of a registration tax was proper.*
It is to be noted that in none of these states is the requirement of
ad valorem taxation combined with the provision that the taxes shall be
uniform on, the same class of subjects, as in our constitution. In the
state of Georgia27 this is the case and the decisions there furnish the
only direct precedents for the instant case outside of Missouri."5 In light
of the literal meaning of the words, of the general state of the authorities, and of the economic considerations involved, it is submitted that
the Georgia decisions are wrong and should not be followed.
Missouri Decisions
The constitution of 1820 contained no provision in regard to uniformity of taxation but did contain a requirement of proportional taxa22. The language
of the Nebraska
Constitution, art. IX,
see. 1, which is
followed almost exactly in Illinois and
Maine, is as follows:
"The legislature

follows:

shall provide

authority levying the tax, and
levied
and
collected
under

such revenues as may be
needful by levying a tax by valuation
so that every person or corporation shall
pay in proportion to the value of his or
its franchises."
23.
Opinion

of

the

Justices (1915)

220 Mass. 613, 108 N. E. 570.
24. Art. 1, sec. 4.
25.
Opinion of the Justices, supra,
note 23.
26. In
Re the Okla. National Life
Co. (1918) 173 Pac. (Okla.) 376, holding a secured debts law constitutional.
27. The provision in Georgia is as

"All taxation shall be uniform

on the same class of subjects and ad
valorem on all property subject to be
taxed within the territorial limits of the
shall be
general

laws."
Art. 7, sec. 2.
It is to be noted that the last clause
might be construed
as requiring the
principle of the general property tax to
be followed.
This portion of the provision is not found in the Missouri Constitution.
28. Mayor v. Weed (1890) 84 Ga. 1.
c. 685, 11 S. 1E. 235, 8 L. R. A. 270;
Verdery v. The Village of Summerville
(1888) 82 Ga. 138, 8 S. E. 213, cited
in the case under review.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

tion very similar to that in the present fundamental law.'
The same
provision with minor verbal changes was carried into the constitution of
186580 and an enumeration of classes of property which could be exempted was added. In the constitution of 1875, sec. 3, art. 10 was added and
a very elaborate schedule of maximum rates was placed in a new article
on taxation and revenue.
The first case in which the question here involved arose was Crow
v. State,' decided under the constitution of 1820. A special tax of a
higher rate was levied on goods shipped into the state from foreign
states for purposes of sale here. Though the tax was in name a license
tax, it was held to be in reality a property tax. A majority of the
court speaking through Birch, J., held that section 19 of article 13 (the
analogue of section 4 of article X of the present constitution) forbade
legislative classification.'
In a lengthy opinion 8 he upheld the now long
exploded economic theory on which the general property tax was supposed to rest. Napton, J., in a well reasoned dissenting opinion, interpreted the provision as prohibiting specific taxes rather than ad valorem
taxes but as not to prevent discrimination in the rate of ad valorem
taxes charged on different articles of property.5 ' If the distinctions were
arbitrary and unjust he argued the remedy was at the polls and not in
29. Constitution of .1821, art. 13, sec.
19, part of the Bill of Rights: "We de.
clare . . . that all property subject
to taxation shall be taxed in proportion
to its value."
This is the only provision on taxation in the constitution of
1820.
30. Constitution of 1865, art. 1, sec.
30, part of Bill of Rights:
"We de.
clare . . . that all property ought to
be taxed in proportion to its value."
Art. 11, sec. 16 (No property shall be
exempt from taxation etc.)
31.
32.

(1851) 14 Mo. 237.
1. c. 255.

33. "Concerning the mere grammatical
signification of the sentence, there can
probably be no disagreement of opinion;
and when it is considered in connection
with the contemporary fact, that under
the terms of our admission into the Union, the State was, on the same day the
constitution was adopted, binding itself
by ordinance to forbear to tax certain

descriptions of property, and that in virtue of the residue of its sovereignty in
that respect,
'all' other property was
'subject to taxation,' the sentence would
seem almost historically, no less than
verbally, to have been predicated upon
the design which was entertained to repudiate and repress all favoritism or oppression, in the nature of class legisla.
tion, or otherwise, by ordaining that in
Missouri, as in other States, a general
pro rata assessment and
taxation--as
simple and comparatively unexpensive in
its enactment and execution, as it was
unvaryingly just and equitable in its design and in its consequences-should be
interposed as the irreversible rule of action and of right in the State they are
founding."
See also the attempt to justify the
general property tax in
the following
paragraphs.
34.

1. c. 324.
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the courts.'
Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment it may be
added that a remedy is now afforded by that constitutional guaranty.'
In Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court' the Supreme Court upheld
a law requiring St. Louis county to pay additional compensation to certain judicial officers. It was assumed that this would increase the county
tax rate. The court in considering section 19 of the Bill of Rights"
stated: "It is not necessary in this case to decide whether a different
rate of taxation can be imposed upon different descriptions of property,
all being taxed by an ad valorem tax. The idea of equality in taxation
is certainly not the prominent idea conveyed by this clause; nor can
we suppose that it was designed to be conveyed, when we consider that
so many constitutions of other states previously adopted, contain clauses
expressly enjoining equality in taxation, and when the insertion of a
word or two in the clause would have expressed the idea clearly. It
may be further observed that if equality in taxation is required by this
section, then the provision in the first section of the tenth article, that
the lands of non-residents shall never be taxed higher than the lands
of our citizens, is entirely superfluous.""
Of the cases decided under
the constitution of 1865, a majority seem to turn on the question of exemption from taxation.*
In the present constitution the section requiring taxes to be proportional is joined with the requirement of uniformity of taxation for
the first time.' The courts of the state have repeatedly interpreted the
new section as permitting the classification of subjects of taxation.0
The Missouri decisions, therefore, like most of those in the country at
large left the precise question involved in the instant case undecided. The
manner being res integra, the question of the economic policy involved
becomes important.
Economic Principles Involved
The theory of taxation which underlies the decision in the instant
case is one which has long been abandoned by economic science.'
It
is the theory that the rate of taxation and the manner of assessment
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
(1885)
41.
42.
brinck

1. c. 325.
See note 18 supra.
(1851) 15 Mo. 3.
Supra note 29.
15 Mo. 1. c. 24.
See, for example, Cook v. Stuart
85 Mo. 575.
Sees. 3-4, art. 10.
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Woll(1918) 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W.

196; Mass. Bonding and Insurance Co.
v. Chorn (1918) 274 Mo. 15, 201 S. W.
1122; Express Co. v. City of St. Joseph
(1877) 66 Mo. 675, 27 Am. Rep. 382
(under constitution of 1865).
43. Washington Univernty Sdudies,
Humanistic Series, 1919; Seligman, Es
says in Taxation, MeMillian (1905) Chap.
II; Adams, Finance, Henry Holt Co.
(1898) pp. 369 etc.
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should be the same on all classes of property." The general property tax
which originated as a land tax was early extended to other species of
property in a crude attempt to establish primitive standards of economic
justice. The impossibility of applying this kind of taxation to personalty becomes evident as soon as a given community attains any complexity of civilization.'
If we levy our present 3% tax upon secured
debts bearing interest of 4%, taxation becomes virtually confiscation.
As it is practically impossible to discover the existence of such debts
without the cooperation of their owner the practice of failing to declare
much property of this kind follows and is almost universal." Penitentiary
sentences would not bring to light all such hidden property."
The suggestion reminds one of the futile attempt of a Roman Emperor to prevent similar tax dodging by the application of torture to suspected persons." Even if the impossible could be performed and the general property tax be made to apply to such securities, money would seek investment in tax exempt bonds and in indebtedness bearing a high rate of
interest." The result of this would be a high interest rate to the individual borrower, and small municipalities and local governmental units
would be unable to float their necessary long time 4% loans. Besides,
the theoretical injustice of such inflexible taxation is obvious."
The
rate of taxation to the individual should be based on his ability to pay.
This in turn is to be measured by his income. To say that his possession
of property without regard to the nature thereof, is a proper measure
of his ability to pay taxes is impossible in the light of present economic
knowledge. Legislative classification, therefore, is necessary in order
that our system of taxation shall bear a reasonable correspondence to
the facts of our present economic order.
44. See the view expressed by the
court in the case under review, 234
S. W. I. c. 65, and the language used in
the Crow case, supra, note 31.
45. Seligman, op. cit., p. 37
46. See the article cited from Washington University Studies, supra, note
43, and, in particular, a table of statistics from St. Louis county showing that
in the cases of a large number of representative citizens the amount of personalty declared was very much smaller
than the amount which they were shown
to have possessed at their death by the
records of the probate court.
47. 234 S. W. I. c. 65.

48. Seligman, Essays in Taxation, p.
42 note.
49. Such as federal bonds, farm loans,
etc. As the high interest securities are
held for the most part by the rich and
the low interest securities are confined
almost exclusively to the poor who cannot take the risk that usually accompanies high interest investments the tax
is in reality regressive and falls on those
who can least afford to bear it.
50. See authorities collected in note
43, supra, and in particular Adams, op.
cit. p. 371 etc. For general discussion of
the matter by an European authority, see
Leroy-Beaulieu, Science des Finances,
Vol. III, p. 498.
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Conclusion
The decision under review may be justified upon the theory that
the taxation of securities under the provision of the act was to be based
on their face value and not their actual value." But if it goes farther
and is held to stand for the proposition laid down by the court-that
legislative classification of property is improper-it involves economic
consequences of a far reaching and most detrimental nature. The unfortunate results of this rule may now be obviated only by a constitutional amendment. It has been proposed in the Constitutional Convention to change section 4 by the substitution of the word "assessment"
for the word "taxation."' 2 Under a decision in Oklahoma this would make
But the matter should not be left
legislative classification possible."
open to doubt and if the provisions of section 4 are retained at all the
power of the legislature to classify should be made plain."

Hannibal, Missouri

BEN ELY, JR.

CODE PLEADING-NECESSITY OF DISCLOSING WAIVER
WHEN WAIVING TORT AND SUING IN ASSUMPSIT. Duncan
et al v. Smith. Pitcock v. Higgins!
In Duncan et al v. Smith et al, the following statement was filed in
the justice court:
"Jefferson City, Mo., Feb. 25, 1918.
"E. C. Smith to Emmet Duncan and James Kelly co-partners, Dr.
To 40 bushels of soft corn at 50 cents per bushel, $20.00."
In the trial upon appeal in the circuit court, a motion for a directed
verdict for defendant was sustained to evidence which tended to show
51. 234 S. W. I. c. 65.
52. It has been proposed in the constitutional convention to adopt an amendment which unintentionally might bring
about this result, for it is proposed to
change the section to read that all property shall be assessed at one.half of its
real value. The true object of this
amendment would seem almost absurd,
but incidentally it might bring about the
result by the inadvertent substitution of
words pointed out.
53. Re Okl. National Life Co. (1918)
173 Pac. 376.
54. By some section providing that
the legislature may classify property for
the purpose of imposing different rates on

different subjects of taxation. The classification would still have to be based
on some reasonable basis and would have
to bear some relation to the facts of economic science. Otherwise, it would fall
within the inhibition of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution.
In this review there has been no attempt to consider whether the legislation
conflicts with section 22 of article 10 of
the constitution. If so, an act could have
been framed (it is believed) to have
avoided this conflict.
1. (1920) 226 S. W. 621, K. C. Ct.
of Apps.
2. (1922) 239 S. W. 870, Spg. Ct.
of Apps.
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that defendant's cattle had come upon plaintiff's land and had eaten
and destroyed forty bushels of corn. The ruling below was affirmed by
the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
The reason given for the decision by the Kansas City Court of Appeals was that the statement alleged a cause of action in assumpsit and
consequently was not sufficient to advise defendant of the nature of
the claim and to operate as a bar to another action on the same demand.
The court stated that the right of plaintiffs to waive the tort and sue
in assumpsit was doubtful, but that if they had such right they in some
way should have disclosed in their statement that they had waived the
tort and were suing in assumpsit.
Pitcock v. Higgins was an action begun in a justice of the peace
court wherein the statement filed was as follows:
$15.00
"March 13, 1920, one tire and inner tube ------------50.00
---------------------------May, 1920, one battery
8.50
----------------------------------One blow torch
3.00
-----------------------------Onetor Pitcock, labor
2.45
September 11 and 12, 1920, store account --------------Total

--------------------------------------

$78.95

The battery item, as the trial turned out, was the only item for consideration. Plaintiff recovered judgment for $35.00 in the circuit court,
upon proof that defendant had committed certain acts of conversion
in taking the battery, without permission, to another town to be charged
and in refusing to get it and return it to plaintiff when requested to do so.
Upon appeal it was contended that the judgment should be reversed
as plaintiff had sued on an account, as for a sale, and had proven a tort,
viz, conversion. The Springfield Court of Appeals held plaintiff might
"waive the tort and sue in assumpsit" citing a decision of the Supreme
1
Court'a and one of its own decisions. b Duncan et al v. Smith et al,
supra, was not cited.
The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit seems to be well established in Missouri. That this was true under the common law sys8
tem of pleading is shown by Floyd v. Wiley, reported in the first volume
of the Missouri reports. The court stated: "It does not lie in the
mouth of the defendant to say he is a trespasser." This case was affirmed
on a subsequent trial.
2a. Cowan v. Young (1920) 282 Mo.
36, 220 S. W. 869.
2b. Mathes v. Lumber Co. (1913) 173

Mo. App. 239, 158 S. W. 729.
3. (1824) 1 Mo. 430.
4. (1826) 1 Mo. 643.
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Sandeen v. The Kansas City, St. Joseph and Council Bluffs Railroad
Co.' is cited in Duncan v. Smith, supra, as holding that a tort may not
be waived and suit brought in assumpsit. The only question decided in
the Sandeen case, as a critical examination will show, is one of jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court. The court there held that where
a justice court has jurisdiction of tort cases only to the amount of fifty
dollars, but has jurisdiction of contract cases involving a larger sum, a
plaintiff may not waive the tort for the purpose of bringing the case
within the jurisdiction of the justice court. It is true that Martin, C., a
lawyer learned in the common law,' by way of dictum, seemed to be
of the opinion that it is not permissible, since the adoption of code
pleading, to waive a tort and sue on the contract, but he does not mention prior decisions of the Supreme Court which had. held that as a matter of substantive law a tort may be waived.7 In the later case of
Finlay v. Bryson' the same learned judge stated that the right of plaintiff
to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit is very generally conceded by the
authorities, but that this will not be permitted when the result is to give
jurisdiction over the subject matter to a court which otherwise would
not possess it. The Sandeen case, it is submitted, is not an authority
holding that a tort may not be waived.
Force et al v. Squier," a Supreme Court decision in point, is not
mentioned in Duncan v. Smith, supra. There the court held that the only
question decided by the Sandeen case was one of jurisdiction.
was allowed to recover on the following statement:

Plaintiff

"J. J. Squier in acc't with Chas. E. Force and E. S.
Stewart, Dr. Nov. 4, to 45 loads screenings at $1.75.

$78.75"
The evidence showed that defendant had converted certain screenings.
5. (1883) 79 Mo. 278.
6. Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law.
7. It is true that the same court in
Link v. Vaughn (1853) 17 Mo. 585, took
the position that a tort could not be
waived, but this case has not been followed in later decisions.
Coughlin v. Lyons (1857) 24 Mo. 533
held that the plaintiff might waive the
tort and sue for so much money had and
received.
Hale v. Van Dever (1878) 67 Mo. 732
approves the doctrine set forth in
Coughlin v. Lyons.
Gordon v. Bruner (1872) 49 Mo. 570

held that the tort might be waived and
suit brought for goods sold and delivered.
. . . one who has converted to his
own use the personal property of another, when sued for the value of that
property as sold to him, will not be
permitted to say in defense that he obtained it wrongfully."
8. (1884) 84 Mo. 664.
9. (1896) 133 Mo. 306, 34 S. W. 574.
Edwards v. Albrecht (1890) 42 Mo. App.
497 holds that the tort may not be
waived, but misinterprets the Sandeen
case as overruling the case of Gordon v.
Bruner, supra.
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It is true that Crane v. Murray"' states that the pleading in some
appropriate way, should have disclosed that the claimant had elected to
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit.
In Cowan v. Young," chiefly relied upon in Pitcock v. Higgins, supra,
the Supreme Court affirmed the rule-as a rule of substantive lawthat where defendant has converted plaintiff's personal property plaintiff
may waive the tort and sue for the reasonable value of the property converted. There plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court alleging that
defendant wrongfully took possession of two hundred and forty-six
head of cattle belonging to plaintiff, without paying for them, and that
the cattle, when received by defendant, were reasonably worth $9,865, and
that by reason of the foregoing facts defendant became indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $9,865.00, for which sum judgment was prayed. The
judgment below for plaintiff was affirmed though defendant argued that
under the petition plaintiff should not have been permitted to recover as
the facts alleged showed conversion while the prayer was for the recovery of the contract price.
It seems well established by the foregoing authorities that it is permissible to waive the tort and bring suit in assumpsit.
But it may be asked, is pleading, in the form of the old com10. (1904) 106 Mo. App. 697, 80 S
W. 280.
11. (1920) 282 Mo. 36, 220 S. W.
869. See the Law of Quasi Contracts,
Woodward, Chap. XX. There the learned
author says: "Is this obligation of the
tort-feasor, enforceable in assumpsit, a
primary obligation which results from
the violation of another primary obligation, i. e. the obligation not to commit
a tort? Or is it, like the obligation to
pay damages, a secondary obligation arising upon the commission of a tort? As
a matter of legal theory, it seems more
reasonable to say that in these cases, as
in those in which restitution is allowed
as a remedy for the repudiation or substantial breach of a contract (ante. sec.
260), there is only one primary obligation, and that upon the violation of such
primary obligation the person injured
may elect to demand damages or restitution. If this is the true view, the topic
of the present chapter belongs to the
law of torts or of damages. But, as a
matter of fact, the obligation to make

restitution has been regarded generally
as a primary one; and since, if it is primary, it obviously must be quasi contractual, a consideration of the subject
in this book will not be out of place.
(1) Essential elements of
Sec. 271.
the obligation: (1) The commission of
a tort.-The phrase 'waiver of tort,'
commonly used to denote the election of
It implies
assumpsit, is unfortunate.
that the ueong is waived, which is both
inaccurate and misleading. To speak of
a suit in equity for the specific performance of a contract as a waiver of the
breach would hardly be more objectionable. As is pointed out in the preceding section there is in reality an election
between alternative obligations resulting
from the commission of a tort-an obligation to pay such damages as the plaintiff has suffered, and an obligation to
pay for such benefits as the defendant
has received. Whichever obligation is
chosen to be enforced, there can be no
recovery without proof of the commission
of a tort."

48
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mon counts, now permissible? The following cases are leading authorities in Missouri for the view that the common counts were not expressly
forbidden by the code of civil procedure, but, on the contrary, are retained. Pipkin v. National Loan & Investment Co." states: "The first
count is in assumpsit for money had and received in common law form
and good at common law, and is permissible under the code."
Williams v. The Chicago, Santa Fe and California Ry. Co." holds
that where plaintiff has fully performed his contract and nothing remains but the duty of defendant to pay the stipulated price thereunder,
plaintiff may sue in assumpsit using the common count of quantum meruit.
Moore v. Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co." holds that one who has fully performed his contract may declare on the common counts in assumpsit instead of on the special contract.
In Fox v. Pullman Palace Car Co." it is stated by Judge Thompson
of the St. Louis Court of Appeals that the judges who were called upon
to interpret our code of civil procedure while it was yet new to the profession seemed unable to appreciate fully the spirit in which it was
framed, and subjected it, in some respects, to an unfriendly interpretation. This resulted in preserving some of the abuses of the former
system, which the code was intended to eradicate. One of these abuses
was the rule which allowed a plaintiff, having a right of action arising
upon a contract for the recovery of a definite sum of money, to ignore
the contract which gave him the right of action and merely set up in
his declaration that the defendant was indebted to him in a given sum
of money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff's use. This
rule, he said, "was propogated by our Supreme Court as applicable to
our reformed system of pleading in Stout v. St. Louis Tribune Co."
Although Judge Thompson thought the better view was that the common counts no longer existed he nevertheless recognized that the Supreme Court had decided otherwise and so upheld a common count for
money had and received.
Mansur v. Botts" holds that the common counts are permissible.
It seems therefore to be a well established principles in this state that
the common counts are permissible under the code. Under the common
law system of pleading there was formed a conception that, when the
plaintiff had done everything he was required to do under an express
contract and nothing remained but the defendant's obligation to pay,
there was an implied promise of payment on the part of the defendant.
12. (1899) 80 Mo. App. 1.
13. (1892) 112 Mo. 463, 20 S. W. 631.
14. (1892) 113 Mo. 98, 107; 20 S.
W. 975.

15.
16
17.

(1884)
(1873)
(1883)

16 Mo. App. 122.
52 Mo. 342, 347.
80 Mo. 651.
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Indebitatus assumpsit became concurrent with debt upon a simple con5
tract in all cases." This developed because of the fact that in an action
of debt wager of law was allowed, as the method of trial, and it was
advantageous to the creditor to prevent the defendant and his compurgators from defeating the action by oath. Where there has been a part performance of a contract beneficial to defendant the courts also allowed
plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of the partial performance in
general assumpsit, unless the necessary implication from the terms and
nature of the contract was that complete performance was a condition
precedent to payment of all or any part of the consideration stipulated
for, or unless the contract was void for illegality." One purpose for
which this was evolved was to allow general assumpsit to be brought
instead of special assumpsit.'
The common counts were used when this
implied promise was chosen as the basis of the action.
When, after the adoption of the code, petitions containing the common counts were brought into courts the judges were compelled to decide whether or not these petitions sufficiently stated a cause of action.
The decisions reached in these cases were evidently influenced by the
fact that the courts thought that unless the common counts, which had
,been found so convenient under the older system, were carried bodily
into the code, that part of the substantive law relating to promises implied in law would be destroyed.
For instance, the New York Court of Appeals, shortly after the
adoption of the code of civil procedure, decided that since the common
count of indebitatus assumpsit stated that defendant was indebted to
the plaintiff for a certain amount and that the amount was due and that
payment had been demanded, there were sufficient facts stated to constitute a cause of action. "' Apparently it was not noticed that the legal
effect of the facts is stated instead of the actual facts. The statement
that defendant was indebted to the plaintiff is considered as a statement
of a fact instead of a conclusion of law.
It is a matter of common knowledge that when persons become accustomed to certain habits it is very difficult to suddenly discontinue
these habits. Since judges and lawyers are human beings they are subjected to the same weaknesses and frailities as those without the profession. When the code was adopted many of the practices which
existed under the older system were transferred into the code. Among
these was the use of the common counts.
18. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, page 149.
19, Martin, Civil Procedure, sec. 58.

20. Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights, see. 543-4.
21. Allen v. Patterson, (1852) 7 N. Y.
476.
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It has been seen that where there has been a tort, of a certain type,
committed against him, plaintiff has the legal right to waive the tort
and sue defendant as one who had agreed to buy something or to pay
over money. It has been further seen that when one exercises the privilege and brings a suit which corresponds to the common law action of
assumpsit he may make use of the common counts as they were developed
in the system of common law pleading. This is an exception to the
rule of codd pleading that the facts that constitute the alleged cause
of action must be set forth in the petition. In view of these two propositions it can hardly be said that when the tort is waived there must be
a disclosure of the waiver. It is permissible to waive the tort and sue
in contract. It is permissible to use the common counts when suing in
contract. Duncan et al v. Smith et al, supra, seems to be without controlling authority for the statement that there must be a disclosure of
the fact that there has been a waiver.
FRANK DoYLE'

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-EFFECT
OF DIVORCE.
State v. Ellison.1 A husband purchased land and had it conveyed to himself and his wife. The wife procured a divorce. The husband brought
suit for partition and on her death it was continued against her heirs.
It was held that the husband and wife took the land by entirety, but on
divorce this was changed to a tenancy in common and the wife's heirs
were entitled to an undivided half.
As to tenancy by the entirety Blackstone says,
"Joint tenants are said to be seised per my et per tout, by the half
or moiety, and by all: that is, they each of them have the entire possession as well of every parcel as of the whole. They have not,
one of them a seisin of one half or moiety, and the other of the other
moiety; neither can one e exclusively seised of one acre, and his
companion of another: but each has an undivided moiety of the
whole, and not the whole of an undivided moiety. And therefore,
if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither
properly joint tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife
being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate
by moieties, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout, et non per
my: the consequence of which is, that neither the husband nor the
wife can dispose of any part without the consent of the other, but
the whole must remain to the survivor."
22. Student, School of Law, Univer
sity of Missouri.

1. 233 S. W. 1065 (Mo. 1921)
2. 2 Bl. Corn. (Lewis Edition) 648.
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According to the above the estate by entireties was dependent on the
fact that the law regarded husband and wife as one person, even though
the consent of the two individuals who made up this legal person was
necessary to alien it. The estate could be created only where the conveyance was made to a married couple. If made to a man and woman
who subsequently married, they would hold as they did before marriage,
either as joint tenants or as tenants in common. Since husband and wife
might thus hold property as joint tenants or as tenants in common,
the character of the tenancy not being changed by marriage, it was argued
there was nothing in the marriage relation itself to prevent such holding
and, consequently, it has come to be the weight of authority that land
may be conveyed to the husband and wife as joint tenants or as tenants
in common.'
If no intent is expressed the presumption is that they
intended to take by entirety. The result is, as one author says, that
the existence of such a tenancy is purely a matter of the intention of
the one making the conveyance
Hence, while this peculiar form of
estate may have arisen because husband and wife were regarded by the
law as one person, in many states it has become an established form of
tenancy, without regard to the reason for its origin, for the law ordinarily does not now regard husband and wife as one person. Thus, while
the tenancy arose because of this fictional unity it now persists after
the reason has ceased to exist. Some states have held that the so-called
"Married Women's Acts"' have had the effect of abolishing tenancies
by entireties, but most states have held the contrary 7 Among the latter
is Missouri.' In a few jurisdictions such tenancies have been declared to
be out of harmony with the modern law and are therefore no longer
3. See Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd
ed. 646.
4. See cases collected in 21 Cyc. 1198.
5. See Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd
ed. 647.
6. Donegan v. Donegan (1893)
103
Ala. 488, 15 So. 823; Whyman v. Johnston (1917) 62 Col. 461, 163 Pac. 76;
Lawler v. Byrne (1911) 252 Ill. 194,
96 N. E. 892; Robinson's Appeal (1895)
88 Me. 17, 33 Atl. 652; Semper v. Coates
(1904) 93 Minn. 76, 100 N. W. 662;
Clark v. Clark (1875) 56 N. H. 105;
Green v. Cannady (1907) 77 S. C. 193,
57 S.
. 832; Thornley v. Thornley
(1893) 2 Ch. 229.
7. See cases collected in Tiffany, Real
Property, 2nd ed. 650.
8. Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh (1918) 273

Mo. 353, 201 S. W. 72; Stifel's Union
Brewing Co. v. Saxy (1918) 273 Mo. 159,
201 S. W. 67. The peculiar view which
the courts take of the statutes which
give to married women power to contract and to manage and alien their own
separate property is shown by the following quotation from the latter case.
"That language is a clear and irrefutable
statement of the conclusion that the
Married Women's Acts are not intended
to weaken or destroy that unity of husband and wife which treats them as
equals, but that they do destroy that
unity of the two which considers the
wife as merged in the husband." The
latter so called "unity" is of course the
only one that ever existed. "That unity
of husband and wife which treats them
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Missouri, however, is one of the states in which this form

of tenancy persists with full force and vigor." One may plausibly argue
that this form of tenancy offers certain conveniences and advantages to
married couples, which justify its retention in the law, although the
technical basis for the tenancy, the language of the courts to the contrary notwithsanding, certainly no longer exists in this state. At any
rate, so far it has seemingly had the full approval of the courts and
has not been disapproved by the Legislature of the state."
The principal case involves the question as to the effect of a divorce
a vinculo on land held by the entirety, a question which has quite frequently arisen in this state as well as in other states where this form of
tenancy still exists." A few courts have held that a divorce does not
affect the character of the tenancy, apparently regarding title as fixed and
vested in the parties.13 The great majority have held as in the principal case, that the tenancy by the entirety is changed by divorce to a
joint tenancy or a tenancy in common.1" Probably in all of the states
it can fairly be said that the ancient conception that man and wife are
legally one person no longer obtains.
On what possible theory can a decree of divorce which makes no
mention of property held by the entirety produce such a change in the
form of holding such property? The theory is stated by a Missouri court
as follows: "As a legal unity of husband and wife was the only basis
of the estate by entirety, the destruction of that unity by divorce nec-

as equals" necessarily is the opposite of
unity of person if it means anything at
all.
9. See Whittlesey v. Fuller (1853)
11 Conn. 337; Kerner v. McDonald
(1900) 60 Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92; Sergeant V. Steinberger (1826) 2 Ohio' 305,
15 Am. Dec. 553; Helvie v. Hoover
(1902) 11 Okla. 687, 69 Pac. 958.
10. The first decision seems to be
Gibson v. Zimmerman (1849)
12 Mo.
385.
Since then decisions have been
numerous.
11. See Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65
Mo. 670, 675.
12. The doctrine that a divorce a vinculo destroys a tenancy by the entirety
and converts it into another form of tenancy arose first in this country.
Here
such divorces have long been common.
This was not the case in England. The

first case apparently was Ames v. Nor.
man (1857) 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 683.
13. Re Lewis' Appeal (1891) 85 Mich.
340, 48 N. W. 580; Alles v. Lyon (1907)
216 Pa. St. 604, 66 AtI. 81; Davis v.
Johnson (1916)
124 Ark. 390, 187 S.
W. 323.
14. The
numerous
cases
will
be
found collected in Notes in 30 L. R. A.
333, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463 and L. R.
A. 1915 C. 396.
Some of the Missouri
cases are Aeby v. Aeby (1916) 192 S. W.
97; Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy
(1918) 273 Mo. 139, 201 S. W. 67; Ash.
baugh v. Ashbaugh (1918) 273 Mo. 353,
201 S. W. 72; Joerger v. Joerger (1906)
193 Mo. 133, 91 S. W. 918; Bender v.
Bender (1920) 281 Mo. 473, 220 S. W.
929; Haguewood v Britain (1917)
273
Mo. 89, 199 S. W. 950; Russell v. Russell (1894)

122 Mo. 235, 26 S. W.

677.
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essarily makes the tenants by entirety tenants in common." " In other
words, while husband and wife in Missouri do not necessarily take as
tenants by entirety but only presumptively so take if the contrary is not
expressed, the tenancy is dependent on unity of person and the destruction of that unity "necessarily" destroys the tenancy. Thus, it is
assumed that there is an unity of the husband and wife.
If tenancy by the entirety still exists as the courts hold, then one
can commend the result of the decision of the principal case so far as
it goes, even if the reason by which that result is reached is subject to
criticism. Most of us would probably agree that a wife who secures a
divorce, particularly if she secures alimony; ought not have the benefit
of property held by the entirety as if the marriage relation still existed.
Therefore after the divorce there ought to be some way in which the
interests of the parties in property held by the entirety could be equitably adjusted by the courts. The result reached in the principal case
is probably more desirable than to leave the tenancy as it was, and so
far the courts have not found a way to reach a better adjustment of
such property interests in most cases. Where the purchase money has
been furnished by the wife and applied to the purchase by the husband without her consent, a court of equity will declare a resulting trust
in her favor, thus giving her the entire property," but where the price
has been furnished by the husband or voluntarily furnished by the wife
the result realized in the principle case invariably follows if there is a
Perhaps it would be best to declare this peculiar
subsequent divorce.'
tenancy can no longer be created because it arose on a conception of the
marriage relation which was medieval and is now obselete. But if it be
still recognized as valid then the result reached in the principal case
would seem to be preferable to holding the tenancy survives the dissolution of the marriage.
P. M. P.

15. Russell v. Russell (1894) 122 Mo.
235, 238, 26 S. W. 677. As will be seen
by reference to the eases in note 8 supra, the Missouri Supreme Court assumes the fictional unity of persons in
its recognition of the tenancy by the
entirety and when this is dissolved by divorce the tenancy falls with it. It then
becomes a tenancy in common because of
2273 R. S. Mo. 1919, which provides
that on conveyance to two or more per-

sons they shall be presumed to take as
tenants in common.
16. Moss v. Aldrey (1914) 260 Mo.
595, 169 S. W. 6; Donovan v. Griffith
(1908) 215 Mo. 1.c. 166, 114 S. W. 621.
17. See Bender v. Bender (1920) 281
Mo. 473, 220 S. W. 929, where the purchase price was furnished by the husband and Haguewood v. Britain (1917)
273 Mo. 89, 199 S. W. 950, where it was
furnished by the wife.
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TORTS-ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH. Grier v. Kansas
City C. C. & St. Joseph Ry. Co.' In the present case plaintiff as administrator for Ralph W. Grier's estate sued defendant company for ten
thousand dollars, the action falling under Section 4217, R. S. Mo. 1919.'
The facts show that deceased was a passenger on defendant's interurban
railway, that the car in which he was riding was negligently driven at
a high rate of speed around a curve, that it left the track and turned
over pinning deceased under it, and that the latter died a short time
thereafter from injuries received. Deceased, Grier, a lawyer with a lucrative practice, left no relatives and no evidence was adduced of pecuniary loss to anyone. In fact, instructions were given at the request of
both parties withdrawing from the jury the matter of pecuniary loss.
The defendant asked for an instruction to the effect that plaintiff
if entitled to recover at all, could recover no more than two thousand
dollars. This instruction was refused and an instruction was given for
plaintiff in these words: "In determining the amount you will award
the plaintiff you may take into consideration the facts constituting the
negligence, if any, on the part of the defendant causing the death of
the said Ralph W. Grier, including the aggravating circumstances, if any,
attending such negligence as is shown by the evidence." The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for ten thousand dollars.
These rulings, both as to the refusal of the defendant's offered instruction and the allowance of that of the plaintiff, are held correct by
the Supreme Court and the verdict for ten thousand dollars is affirmed
because, so reads the decision: "It appears from the undisputed facts
that the conduct of the defendant's motorman in the management of the
train on which Grier was riding was so reckless and so grossly negligent
as to show an utter disregard for the lives of the passengers entrusted
to his care." This then, it would seem, is a holding squarely to the effect
that the statute is penal up to ten thousand dollars, thus distinctly overruling the prior Supreme Court decisions holding it to be penal as to
two thousand dollars but above that amount compensatory.
The varied course of this statute is set out by Ragland, C., who
1. (1921) 228 S. W. 454.
2. This was section 5425 R. S. Mo.
1909. It reads, so far as is material,
as follows: "Whenever any person . .
. shall die from any injury resulting or

train of cars . . . the corporation
. . in whose employ any such .
servant (or) employee . . . shall be
at the time such injury is committed .
. . shall forfeit and pay as a penalty,

occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent of any . . .
servant or employee, whilst running . .

for every such person . . . so dying, the sum of not less than two
thousand dollars and not exceeding ten

any . . . car or train of cars,
or any . . . electric . . . car or

thousand dollars in the discretion
the jury," etc.

of

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

wrote the opinion and in two prior notes in the Law Series on the subject.' Passed first in 1855, the section provided that the defendant, the
premises having been found, "shall forfeit and pay for every such person
or passenger so dying the sum of five thousand dollars." This statute
was held to be purely penal.' Some decisions spoke of its compensatory
features but these statements were dicta, the decisions of the courts
being very clear that pecuniary losses to the party beneficiary were not
The section was
proper elements for the consideration of the jury
amended in 1905 to read, "shall forfeit and pay as a penalty . . . not
less than two thousand dollars, and not exceeding ten thousand dollars in
the discretion of the jury."
It would seem reasonable that if before amendment of 1905 the
section was construed as fixing a penalty it would continue to be so
construed thereafter when the express words, "as a penalty" were inserted, and this view was taken in the first case in which the question
was raised in the Supreme Court of the state.' The first Boyd case
was a holding that can be reconciled with the present case.! The second,la
although it contains much argument to the effect that the statute is penal
as to $2,000 only and compensatory above that amount, nevertheless approved an instruction (apparently without noticing its effect) permitting the jury, in assessing the amount of damages they would award
a plaintiff above two thousand dollars, to take into consideration the
facts constituting negligence on the part of the defendant. Reynolds,
P. J., in a case arising soon after the amendment, said: "Section 2864
. . . (the section under consideration) remains as before in that it im3. 3 Law Series University of Mis.
souri Bulletin 38. 18 Law Series University of Missouri Bulletin 45.
4. Casey v. Transit Co. (1905) 116
Mo. App. 235, 91 S. W. 419; 8. C. (1907)
205 Mo. 721, 103 S. W. 1146 .
5. Young v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co.,
(1910) 227 Mo. 307, 127 S. W. 19. See
also for similar holdings, Ervin v. St.
L. I. M. & S. Ry. (1911) 158 Mo. App.
1, 139 S. W. 498; Mayes v. St. L. 1.
M. & S. Ry. (1911) 158 Mo. App. 461,
138 S. W. 937; Troll v. Laclede Gaslight
Co. (1914) 182 Mo. App. 600, 169 S. W.
337; Nicholas v. Kelley (1911) 159 Ma
App. 20. In construing section 8523 R:
S. Mo. 1909, pertaining to death by automobile, section 5224 was thought to be
penal.

6. Young v. Railroad (1910)
307, 127 S. W. 19.

227 Mo.

7. Boyd v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1911)
236 Mo. 54, 139 S. W. 561.
7a. Boyd v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1913)
249 Mo. 110, 155 S. W. 13. The instruction approved in this Boyd case (249 Mo.
"and
120)
reads
in
part:
1. c.
in determining the amount you will allow her . . . you may also "thk
into consideration the facts constituting
negligence on the part of the defendant
The apparent incausing the death."
consistency in that decision is also pointed out by Reynolds, P. J., dissenting in
Lasater v. Ry. (1913) 177 Mo. App. 1.c.
545, where he argues strongly for the
actual holding in the second Boyd case.
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poses a penalty on one coming within its provisions, the only difference being that the penalty is any sum in the discretion of the jury, within the
limits provided."'
Lamm, J., said: "In one permissible view of the
new statute, (and one most obvious) it is penal and nothing else. The
lawmakers said so."'
Surely, this is a cogent reason. The provision
stating that the sum was to be assessed, within the limits provided, "within
the discretion of the jury" does not seem inconsistent with the idea of
its being at the same time a penalty.
That phrase has, however, been the source of much difficulty and
the decisions which hold the statute to be partly penal and partly compensatory are based upon it and the fact that a variable sum is provided
for So, Graves, J., in a dissenting opinion, in a case arising subsequently to the case under review, states the argument in this form."
There are in this state no degrees of negligence; if, therefore, this is a
penalty for negligence only there is nothing for the jury to find save
want of due care under the circumstances; there is, therefore, nothing
upon which the jury can exercise its discretion.
It is true, as he
states, that we have no doctrine of degrees of negligence, as such, but
it has never been doubted that the law regards some conduct as more
reprehensible than other conduct. Even though in two cases defendants
are negligent, as to one there may be a mere failure to exercise ordinary
care while the other defendant may be, as is said in the present opinion
and quoted supra, "so reckless and so grossly negligent as to show an
utter disregard for the lives of the passengers entrusted to his care."
Though our basic rule of law, the very test of liability, is that one is
responsible if he fails to use the degree of care that would have been
used by an ordinarily prudent man under the same or similar circumstances, it is also unquestionably true that in two or more situations resulting in injury that there are wide variations from the norm of ordinary care. In one case defendant's conduct may be only slightly below
ordinary care, while in another case his conduct may be greatly below
ordinary care.'
8. Potter v. Railroad (1908)
App. 1. c. 144.

136 Mo.

tion, as pecuniary loss, or, if not that, as
having regard to the aggravating or miti-

9. Murphy v. Wabash Ry. (1910) 228
Mo. 1. c. 86. Lamm, J., further says,
though: "But when the whole statute is
read and harmonized it might appear
amount if left alone as nakedly and
baldly penal, and that the discretion of

gating circumstances of the individual
case." He expressly reserved the point,
no brief being before him as to it. Later
he concurred in the opinion by Brown,
J., in the second Boyd case.
10. Midwest National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Davis (1921) 233 S. W. 406.

the jury to go above that amount might
be gauged on the theory of compensa-

McPheeters v. H. and St. Joe Rd. Co.

(by

construction)

that

the

minimum

11.

Salmond on Torts, 3rd ed. p. 27.
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Though Graves, J., is correct in his statement of basic principles
in the common law of negligence, this statue is to be, and can be, applied with reference to what it provides, and the only question is, does
it, or might it, provide a penalty for aggravated negligence. Section
4219, R. S. Mo. 1919,"2 certainly provides that in assessing the amount the
defendant shall pay, the jury may consider the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect or default. This
clearly requires the very thing Graves, J., says is not legally possible.
Section 4217 states that is to be a penalty. Why, we ask, should we limit
that word's meaning or delete it?
Another argument is employed against the interpretation of the section making it purely penal.1a It is found in the second Boyd case,"
by the way of argument, and in the two cases following it in the Supreme Court. 4 It is said that the statute, prior to the amendment of
1905, produced inequitable results in as much as it placed the same penalty upon a company for killing a vagabond, whose death was an economic benefit to his family, as it did for killing a most productive and
generous citizen; that this inequitable result was contemplated by the
legislature and that the amendment was an attempt to correct this re(1869) 45 Mo. 22; Young v. St. L. I.
M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910) 227 Mo. 1. c.
332. See 18 Law Series 48 and 19 Law
Series 51.
12. "Damages accruing under the
last preceding section shall be sued for
and recovered by the same parties and
in the same manner as provided in section 4217; and in every such action the
jury may give such damages, not exceeding ten thousand dollars as they may
deem fair and just, with reference to the
necessary injury resulting from such
death, to the surviving parties who may
be entitled to sue, and also having regard to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attending such wrongful
act, neglect or default."
12a. Perhaps the description should
be, penal with compensatory features.
13. (1913) 249 Mo. 110 1. c. 123.
After stating the argument outlined above
the court by Brown, J., said: "If they"
the legislators, "desired to reduce the
recovery below $5000 or increase it above
that sum solely on account of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances at-

tending the killing, it would have been
the most natural course for the lawmakers to have specifically directed that
the lower amount of $2000 should be
awarded for the death of parties through
ordinary acts of negligence and the
larger sum of $10,000 for death caused
by acts of gross negligence or criminal
conduct. No such guide for the jury
is found in the statute as amended."
14. Johnson v. Ry. (1917) 270 Mo.
418, 193 S. W. 827. Dunham v. Ellison (1919) 278 Mo. 649, 213 S. W. 459.
Lasater v. Ry. Co. 177 Mo. App. 534.
with apparent reluctance follows the
Boyd case, as it must have, misinterpreting, though, the actual holding, as it is
pointed out by Reynolds, P. J., in his
dissent.
See also for similar holdings
Hartzler v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (1910) 140
Mo. App. 665, 126 S W. 760, and Williams v. Chi. B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1913) 169
Mo. App. 468, 155 S. W. 64, and Rollinson v. Lusk (1920) 203 Mo. App. 31, 217
S. W. 328, and Tibbels v. Chi. & G. W.
Ry. (1920) 219 S. W. 109.
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sult by lowering the penalty in all cases and giving above this minimum
penal sum damages as compensation. The Supreme Court in Young v.
Railroad" had taken a different view of this matter, saying, in upholding
the constitutionality of the amended section: "If there was never any
difference in the circumstances attending the killing of different people
by the negligent running of trains, etc., the legislature might prescribe
a fixed amount as the penalty in every case, as indeed was done in the
statute in question before the amendment; but experience seems to have
taught the lawmakers that different circumstances covered different cases
and they saw fit to provide that the jury might within the limits adjust the
amount of the penalty to the circumstances of the particular case; the discrimination allowed is not against the particular defendant but on account
of the circumstances of the particular case." The dicta in the case under
review, though, would also permit the jury to consider the pecuniary loss
resulting to the party entitled to sue as an aid in assessing the penalty.
The argument as to this point also seems sound. There is no rule of
law that provides that this shall not be done.
In this connection let us consider sections 4218 and 4219." These
two sections were passed with 4217 and all are death statutes, so cai~ed.
Both 4217 and 4219 provide maximum sums of $10,000. Section 4219
provides, and lid from the first, that "damages accruing under th, last
preceding section shall he sued for and recovered by the same parties
and in the same manner as provided in section 4217." The three sections were, therefore, in the mind of the Legislature at the same time,
and, we think, it is not straining reason to say that in so far as the
legislature failed to make the sections different they are to be taken to
have substantially the same meaning. They are different in that 4217
states that the wrongdoer "shall forfeit and pay as penalty." No such
words are found in 4219. In 4217 the words are (following the statement that defendant shall forfeit and pay as a penalty not less than two
thousand dollars and not exceeding ten thousand dollars), "in the discretion of the jury." In 4219 the provision is, "the jury may give such
damages, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, as they may deem fair and
just . . . " So far, then, there are two prominent points of dif15.
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thousand dollars,

as they may

deem

1.

fair and just, with reference to the nec-

16. Section 4219 reads: "Damages
accruing under the last preceding section
shall be sued for and recovered in the
same manner as provided in Section 4217,

essary injury resulting from such death,
to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue, and also having regard to
the mitigating and aggravating circum-

and in every such action the jury may
give such damages, not exceeding ten

stances attending such wrongful act, neglect or default."
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ference:
(1) the extra words "as a penalty" in 4217, and (2) the
fact that in 4217 the minimum is fixed at two thousand dollars. Section 4219 further provides as to the amount of damages that the jury
shall fix as the recovery (not more than ten thousand dollars) by "also
having regard to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect or default." If we add, then, to 4217
the further clause that the jury may consider "the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect or default" that section would stand out boldly as penal. It would then
have been most reasonable to have said that in 4217 the legislators have
said that there shall be a penalty within the discretion of the jury, without setting out the very things the jury may consider; but that in 4219
they have given us the elements of the penalty and these may well be
used in cases falling under 4217. This reasoning finds support in a
Court of Appeals case in which Nixon, J., says: "In estimating the
amount of compensatory damages, if any are allowed, under section 5425
(now 4217 R. S. Mo. 1919), it would seem proper to apply the rule given
by 5427. It will not be assumed that the legislature intended to make a different rule in case of a death occasioned by the negligent act of a transportation company from that applied in case of a death occasioned by the
negligent act of another corporation or person.""
If this reasoning be correct it follows that neither of the reasons
raised against a penal interpretation of the statute is sound.
The Grier case has been followed in subsequent cases, one in the
Supreme Court" and one in a Court of Appeals." In the second case
the court said: "If the jury find the defendant negligent as provided
by section 4217, they must inflict a penalty of not less than $2,000. The
discretion that the statute refers to is one that they exercise in fixing
such damages at any sum between $2,000 and $10,000."
It is submitted that this interpretation of the statute is correct, and
that it is the only interpretation that gives to the language of the act
its plain, ordinary and usual meaning, the fixed rule of statutory construction.'
Though one may doubt whether the jury in every case
will fix the proper amount as the penalty, there is no doubt that the
jury is a body of men that can perform this task, which is essentially
the decision of fact and not the making of a rule governing human
conduct. If there is a dissent from this view, because of the liberty it
17. Hegberg v. St. Louis S. F. Ry.
Co. (1912) 164 Mo. App. 514, 147 S.
W.

1. c. 208.
18. Lackey v. United Rys. Co. (1921)

231 S. W. 956.
19. Bloomcamp

v.

(1922) 236 S. W. 388.
20. R. S. Mo. 1919,

Mo.
Sec.

Pac.
7058.
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gives the jury in such cases, the fault should be found rather with the
legislature than with the court's construction of the sections.2
C. L. C.
WILLS AND PROBATE LAW-PROOF OF EXECUTION BY
ATTESTING WITNESSES. Rayl v. Golfinopulos.' The will of Charles
S. Dunford was contested on the ground of undue influence and mental
incapacity. A jury returned a verdict for contestant. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
Appellant contended that he as proponent of the will had made out
a prima facie case of mental capacity by proving the due execution of
the will, and that since contestant produced no evidence of mental incapacity, it was error to submit the question to the jury with the instruction that the burden was upon the defendant to prove that testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution.
There were three attesting witness to the will but only one of them,
Theodore Rassieur, was produced. Rassieur identified his own signature and testified that those of the other two attesting witnesses were
genuine. He stated, however, that he did not remember the occasion of
the execution; that he did not remember whether Dunford was white
or black. In fact he had "no recollection of the occurrence at all."
Nevertheless, he asserted that all the elements of a good execution were
present and that the testator was of sound mind. Otherwise he, Rassieur, (following his uniform practice) would not have signed the paper
and the attestation

clause upon it.

This testimony formed the basis

of defendant's claim of a prima facie case of Dunford's testamentary
capacity. There was no effort made to procure the other attesting witnesses nor to take their testimony by depositions.
The Supreme Court of Missouri disposed of the above contention
in a terse paragraph which held that the testimony of Rassieur was no
proof of execution at all, but that it was a mere identification of the
witnesses' handwriting which could as well have been done by someone
else and that such evidence did not satisfy the statutes and the authorities.' Thus, it would appear that the Missouri Supreme Court has

adopted the rule requiring all attesting witnesses to a will to be produced
or accounted for in order to prove the execution of the will. The case
under consideration obviously can stand for no further proposition than
21. Since this note was written, an
opinion in another case, viz, McDaniel
v. Hines (1922) (Mo.) 239 S. W. 471,
has appeared, which should be read.

1. (1921) 233 S. W. 1069.
2. Citing R. S. Mo. 1919, Secs. 520524 and Bell v. Smith (1917) 271 Mo.
619, 197 S. W. 128.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

that upon a will contest all the attesting witnesses will be required. It
would certainly not be authority for the proposition that all attesting
witnesses must be produced or accounted for in order to admit a will
to probate in the common form.
Upon the two above questions the authorities in the United States
show a- wide diversity.'
The matter is regulated, at least in part, by
statute in a large number of states.
In England two different rules apply. In the law courts it seems
well settled that the rule is the same with wills as other attested documents and only one attestor need be called.' In chancery the doctrine
seems fairly well established that all the required number of attestors
must be produced.5 The decisions, however, vary somewhat as to the
strictness with which the rule is followed. In Tathain v. Wright,' however, the Lord Chancellor recognized the general principle but limited
it to suits instituted by a devisee to establish a will and refused to apply
it where an heir moved to set one aside. Nevertheless, the chancery rule
seems to well recognized.
In Missouri the exact point in Rayl v. Golfinopulos under consideration seems to have been up for decision on very rare occasions.
Cases are numerous in which the mental capacity of testator and the
question of undue influence are at issue, and the courts have at times
spoken of the necessity of calling the attesting witnesses to prove execution. A Missouri Appeals case decided in 1880 contains a statement that
the rule here and in England is that all the subscribing witnesses in a
will contest must be produced or accounted for."a The question in that
case arose over a directed verdict. Both attesting witnesses had testified. One testified that he did not believe the testator was in his right
mind when he signed the paper. It would seem, therefore, that the
statement is a mere dictum.
In Graham et al v. O'Fallon' the Supreme Court at an early day
made a contrary declaration:
"One of these (subscribing) witnesses will be enough to establish
the due execution of the will if he can prove that he saw the other
witnesses subscribe it in the testator's presence. For the law, which requires the best evidence, does not require all the evidence which might
be given."
3. Wigmore on Evidence, See. 1304.
4. Wright v. Tatham (1834) 1 Adolphus & Ellis 3.
5. Bootle v. Blundell (1815) 19 Vesey, Jr., 494; Grayson v. Atkinson (1752)
2 Vesey, Sr., 454; Ogle v. Cook (1748)

1 Vesey, Sr. 178.
6. (1831) 2 Russell & Mylne 1.
6a. Odenwelder v. Schorr (1880)
Mo. App. 458.'
7. (1834) 3 Mo. 507.
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This seems an accurate statement of the rule which prevailed in the
English law courts. The reason given for the rule is good enough. The
English common law did not develop any general principle that a fact
had to be established by any particular quantity of evidence.'
On the
other hand the inference that there is a general principle requiring the
best evidence to be given must be regarded as unsound.'
The Missouri statutes are silent upon this exact point," although it
has been said that they by implication require the calling of all attesting witnesses."
The Missouri Supreme Court has been cited as standing for the
proposition that all the witnesses to a will need not be called.
Lorts v.
Wash" was cited in support of the proposition. The contestants on appeal contended that the proponent should have been required to produce
all the subscribing witnesses, but the Supreme Court held that though the
appropriate procedure is to produce all the witnesses, yet it was not reversible error not to do so. Mays v. Mays" and Craig v. Craig" involve
the proposition whether both attesting witnesses when called must vouch
for the testator's capacity or vouch for all the details of execution in
order to establish the will. Both cases answer the proposition in the
negative," but it does not appear that either court was called upon to
decide whether or not both attesting witnesses must necessarily be called
by the proponent.
Bell v. Smith" in 1917 is the turning point. The will was probated
in South Carolina, through the evidence of only one of three attesting
witnesses. The other two witnesses were not called or accounted for.
The will devised some realty in Missouri and the Missouri Supreme Court
under the statute then in force"0 tested the proof of execution according
to the law of Missouri. The court held that proof at probate by only
one attesting witness was insufficient under sections 550-554 of the Re8. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1172.
9. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 11731174.
10. R. S. Mo. 1919, Secs. 520-524.
11. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1304
(note).
12. 40 Cyc. 1305-1306.
13. (1903) 175 Mo. 487, 75 S. W.
95.
14. (1393) 114 Mo. 536, 21 S. W.
921.
1.
* ?000) 156 Mo. 358, 56 S. W.
1097.

16. This view is also approved by
Morton v. Heidorn (1896) 135 Mo. 614,
37 S. W. 504.
17. (1917) 271 Mo. 619, 197 S. W.
128.
18. R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 567. "Any
person owning real or personal estate
in this state may devise or bequeath such
property by last will, executed and prov.
ed, if real estate be devised, according
* *
to the laws of this state,
" Amended in 1917. Present form may be found
in R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 537.
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vised Statutes of 19 0 9 ." However, the court refused to give an opinion
as to whether any difference should exist between the proof required
for probate in common form and probate in solemn form. The result of this holding would seem to require all attesting witnesses to be
called in every probate, for it would be futile to require greater precaution at an ex parte hearing before a probate court than would be required in a suit to contest the will after probate in common form. The
court stated that the exact question had never been before the Supreme
Court. That is probably true, since all the decisions, apparently, previous to that time had arisen in cases of will contests,' whereas in Bell
v. Smith the question arose as to the sufficiency of proof for probate in
common form.
With the decision in Rayl v. Golfinopulos the doctrine in Missouri
would seem to be settled. This rule closely resembles that prevailing in
English equity courts. In view of the constant tendency to reduce legal
principles to a rule of thumb, the chances are that the discretion and leniency which the chancellor exercises in applying the rule in England
will be lost in law courts.
Whether or not the most desirable result will follow from adhering
to such a rule is more or less a matter of conjecture. One must look
chiefly to the purpose of the statutes requiring attestation by more than
one person.'
Mr. Wigmore states that the secondary object of such
statutes is to provide "a precautionary supply of persons from whom a
testifier is likely to remain available in spite of the accidents that might
have totally destroyed the supply if there had been but one person provided in advance."'
He further points out that the very purpose of such
statutes is negatived by a rule which makes it essential to call all of the
required number. There is manifestly no propriety in requiring two or
three attesting witnesses in order that the probability will be greater
that one remains available when the document is filed for probate, if
at the latter time all the witnesses must be produced.
The rule represents one of a comparatively few instances in our
system of law wherein it is necessary to establish a fact by a certain
quantity of witnesses. In view of the general rule should the statutes
have been interpreted as they have been? They are not clear but the
fair inference from them seems to be that the witnesses should be produced or accounted for.
There is another problem, however. In Missouri, a will is rcquired
19.
524.
20.

Now R. S. Mo. 1919, Secs. 520Lorts v. Wash,

Craig v.

Craig,

supra.
21.
22.

R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 507.
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1304.
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to have two attesting witnesses.'
If a will is attested by more than
two witnesses ' and two attesting witnesses testify to everything essential
for a proper execution of the will should it be required that all the attesting witnesses be produced or accounted for? Such would seem unnecessary but it is apparently, an open question in Missouri. The authorities seem to be in an unsatisfactory state.2
DLos C. JoHNs'

23. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 507.
24. Such was the fact in Bell v.
Smith and Rayl v. Golfinopulos, supra.
25. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1304
and cases cited. See Dunkenson v. Williams (1922) 242 S. W. 1. c. 658. (Four

attesting witnesses, two testified;
two

in court

room

but

not

other

called; no,

comment on suggested problem.)
26. Student, School of Law, University of Missouri.

